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ABSTRACT: China is undergoing urbanization at a scale and speed that is 
unprecedented in human history. Though urbanization has driven Chinese economic 
growth, it has also caused significant environmental damage. Balancing urban 
development with environmental protection is one of China’s top challenges over the 
upcoming decades; as such, Chinese officials have indicated strong interest in utilizing 
innovative, market-based environmental planning policies such as ecosystem service 
markets. One such ecosystem service market is mitigation banking, where developers 
can offset wetland destruction by purchasing “credits” for wetlands that have been 
restored by mitigation banks in another area. This paper analyzes the feasibility and risk 
considerations for mitigation banking in mainland China, focusing on regulatory and 
entrepreneurial risk. My results suggest that the legal and administrative framework for 
mitigation banking already exists within mainland China; however, regulatory and 
entrepreneurial risk in the Chinese governmental context are considerably higher than 
in the United States. For regulators, this is due to several factors: lack of vertical 
supervision within the Chinese government, the close relationship between real estate 
and politics, and the general emphasis of GDP growth over environmental protection. 
For entrepreneurs, increased risk is due to uncertainty around regulations, a weak 
judicial system, and general corruption. I discuss the implications of these increased 
risks and suggest solutions. 
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1. Introduction 
The scale and speed of China’s urbanization over the past three decades is 
unprecedented in human history. In 1980, China’s urban population was 191 million; by 
2007, this population had grown to 594 million (World Bank, 2008). Furthermore, current 
projections suggest that another 250 million people are expected to migrate from rural 
areas to Chinese cities by 2030 (Woetzel et al., 2009). Though urbanization has driven 
Chinese economic growth and lifted millions out of poverty, it has often come at the cost 
of China’s natural environment --- particularly the quality of its air and water (Liu et al., 
2008; Bennett, 2009). Balancing urbanization with environmental protection is one of 
China’s top challenges over the upcoming decades; this challenge, however, offers 
significant opportunity for companies providing innovative environmental protection 
techniques that are willing to enter into the Chinese market. 
Ecosystem service markets are an emerging set of policies to reduce the 
negative effect of urbanization on the natural environment. One such ecosystem 
services tool is mitigation banking, which allows developers to offset adverse 
environmental impacts of their development by purchasing credits accumulated by 
companies who have restored or protected ecologically important areas. Mitigation 
banking reduces uncertainty around development mitigation, can consolidate monitoring 
in specific areas, and is particularly flexible to suit fast growing areas (USEPA, 2012); 
as such, this innovative planning technique may prove to be particularly suitable for 
mainland China. 
 There is little existing literature that addresses the feasibility and risk 
considerations for mitigation banking in mainland China. This thesis addresses three 
primary research questions. First, does the legal and administrative framework exist 
within China to enable mitigation banking? Second, what Chinese land use policies, 
environmental policies, and governmental organizations would be involved in the 
implementation of mitigation banking? Third, what are the current factors that affect risk 
distribution and structure around emerging ecosystem service markets in China? 
In this article, I first introduce mitigation banking. Next, I address the 
administrative, legal, and environmental structure necessary to utilize mitigation banking 
in China. Third, I assess the regulatory and entrepreneurial risks associated with 
mitigation banking, both in general and in mainland China. I finish the article by 
discussing the feasibility of mitigation banking for regulators and entrepreneurs in 
mainland China. 
 
2. Methodology 
In this thesis, I rely on content analysis, drawing on existing literature on Chinese 
land use policy, environmental policy, and business risk. A majority of this literature 
comes from journals and books that have been edited through a peer-review process. 
For recent news and information for which there is limited published information, I also 
utilize news articles. For analyzing business risk for foreign companies in China, I also 
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rely on analysis and surveys done by consulting organizations and trade groups. This 
information is publicly available online and accessible through their company websites. 
 
3. Ecosystem Service Markets & Wetland Mitigation Banking 
In an effort to mitigate the inefficiencies of top-down regulatory environmental 
policies, there has been a movement toward market-based environmental solutions, 
including ecosystem service markets. An ecosystem service market is a market in which 
ecosystem services, or ecosystem functions that benefit society (ME Assessment, 
2005), are traded. Usually bought and sold through “credits,” developers offset 
destruction in one place with preservation or restoration in another. One example of a 
functioning ecosystem service market is wetland mitigation markets. 
In the United States, wetland mitigation markets are the result of the Clean Water 
Act, which established a “no net loss” policy that prohibits further destruction of 
wetlands (Page & Wilcher, 1990). Developers who wish to fill in a wetland must obtain a 
Section 404 permit from the Army Corp of Engineers. As part of the permit approval 
process, developers must agree to avoid an impact when possible, and then minimize 
and provide compensation for unavoidable impacts. The Army Corp of Engineers has 
relied heavily on compensatory mitigation (Gardner, 2005), particularly mitigation 
banking.  
 Mitigation banks purchase degraded wetlands and begin restoring them to their 
original state. When the restored wetlands achieve specific ecological benchmarks, 
these mitigation banks receive “credits” which can be sold. When developers are unable 
to prevent wetland destruction, they are required to purchase these credits, sold at a 
market price, to offset this destruction. Through this technique, governments can ensure 
environmental protection with lower financial burdens on taxpayers. 
 Mitigation banking has numerous benefits compared to on-site mitigation. First, 
by consolidating wetland restoration and conservation in specific areas, wetland 
maintenance and monitoring is more convenient. Second, wetland restoration is a 
complex process that requires significant expertise; mitigation banking allows for 
developers to focus on building and ecological experts to focus on wetland preservation. 
Third, since credits are purchased by developers before breaking ground, mitigation 
banking removes cost-related uncertainties from the project. 
 
4. Framework for Mitigation Banking in China 
 To be a feasible option for environmental protection in mainland China, mitigation 
banking and other market-based environmental preservation tools require several 
foundational elements, including a compatible land usage policy, flexible environmental 
policy, and appropriate environmental regulators. 
 
4.1. Chinese Governance & the Decentralization of Decision-Making 
China is commonly associated with centrally-mandated, authoritarian rule. While  
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power is certainly derived from the central government, the Chinese government also 
consists of local governments, including at provincial, municipal, and county levels. 
Unlike countries like the United States, with specific powers clearly allocated between 
federal and local governments, all political powers in China are derived from the central 
government and then bestowed to lower levels. This does not, however, mean that 
policies developed at higher levels will be successfully implemented at lower levels.  
Prior to the post-Mao period of “reform and opening up” (‘gaige kaifang’) that 
began in 1978, the administrative system in China was highly centralized, with the 
central government making most development decisions (Zhao, 2011). Beginning in the 
1980s, however, the central government increasingly decentralized fiscal control and 
development decision-making towards local levels of government. As such, local 
governments, including provinces, cities, and districts, have become increasingly 
powerful (Zhao, 2011). Though they remain under supervision of the central 
government, local governments now initiate and implement new policies, laws, and 
reforms; local governments can even delay or evade policies established by the central 
government (Xu, 2006). China’s high level of economic growth over the past three 
decades is often credited to decentralization, as government officials have encouraged 
development with appropriate policies to suit local conditions (Lin & Liu, 2000). The lack 
of strong central leadership, however, has weakened policies such as environmental 
protection that may hinder short-term development (Xu, 2006).  
Decentralization of decision-making has led to challenges with vertical 
supervision and horizontal cooperation across local governments. Vertically, 
decentralization has created problems with authority, with unclear or ineffective 
mechanisms for higher level organizations to supervise lower level organizations (Qiu & 
Li, 2009). For major issues, delay or disregard in the implementation of central 
government policy can result in firings, fines, or even criminal charges for lower level 
officials (OECD, 2006). Environmental protection has generally not reached this level of 
importance, with the benefits gained from encouraging GDP growth through 
development exceeding the risks associated with evasive implementation (Xu, 2011; 
OECD, 2006).  
Horizontally, the lack of central authority has made cooperation between 
governments on the same level more challenging. Governments now vigorously 
compete for development and foreign direct investment. As such, local government 
officials are often willing to overlook regulations, including environmental protection, to 
facilitate development (OECD, 2006), thus disincentivizing cooperation. 
 
4.2. Framework for Environmental Law in China 
Up through the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), little emphasis was placed on 
environmental protection in mainland China. The Environmental Protection Law, first 
passed in 1979 and then modified in 1989, serves as the basis for modern 
environmental policy; the law covers a broad range of environmental topics and 
4 
establishes a system of environmental management, monitoring, liability, and 
enforcement (Beyer, 2006). Specifically related to water policy, the Water Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (2002) is another key piece of legislation that covers the 
development, utilization, and protection of water resources (including surface water and 
groundwater). In February 2008, China issued the Law on the Prevention and Control of 
Water Pollution, which increased punishments for polluters. Environmental protection is 
also a major component of China’s regular Five Year Plans (OECD, 2006), which 
provide major social and economic development initiatives. Beyond official legislation, 
the central government can also enact administrative regulations and rules.  
In terms of policy development, China generally is more concerned with air and 
water pollution than carbon dioxide emissions (Chow, 2013). China has primarily utilized 
command-and-control policies rather than economic incentives; however, they have 
increasingly begun experimenting with economic incentives (Bennett, 2009). Laws, 
when passed, are often ineffective; though this can partially be blamed on problems 
with implementation by local officials, Wang (2006) also attributes their ineffectiveness 
to the structure of Chinese laws, with environmental laws providing vague guidelines 
rather than providing specific, enforceable requirements. 
The Chinese legal system provides a mixed level of support for environmental 
protection. The Chinese court system remains weak, with poorly trained judges being 
influenced by local government officials who fund the courts (Wang, 2006).  However, 
even in situations where the government does not provide compensation for those who 
have been harmed by pollution, court cases can catalyze negotiated solutions, 
increased mediate attention, or heightened scrutiny from higher levels of government 
(Wang, 2006). 
 
4.3. Key Environmental Regulators in China 
In 1998, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) was 
established to develop and enforce environmental policy. Environmental Protection 
Bureaus (EPBs) were also created at all levels of government as extensions of SEPA, 
including at provincial, municipal, and county/village levels. SEPA collects data and 
creates policy, the EPBs are tasked with implementing policies (Beyer, 2006). In spring 
of 2008, to emphasize the importance of environmental protection, SEPA was elevated 
to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). 
Though the MEP maintains theoretical authority over lower-level agencies, in 
practice the national agency has limited leverage in ensuring that national 
environmental regulations and standards are enforced at lower levels (Beyer, 2006). 
This is due to the dual affiliation relationship system set up by the 1989 Environmental 
Protection Law. According to this law, EPBs are accountable to both the local 
government on the same level and the superior level EPB. The goals of these two 
supervising organizations are often not aligned, with EPBs favoring environmental 
protection and local governments encouraging economic development (OECD, 2006). 
5 
Local governments rather than central authorities provide funding to these local EPBs, 
providing significant leverage to encourage EPBs to overlook pollution when it risks 
affecting development (Beyer, 2006; Chow, 2013; OECD, 2006). The law does not, 
however, discuss the levels of environmental deterioration necessary for higher levels of 
EPBs to supercede local authority (Environmental Protection Law, 1989). 
In response to this issue, the MEP established six regional Supervision Centres 
for Environmental Protection (SCEPs) --- modeled on the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency --- that would remain under its direct control to increase oversight 
over local EPBs. These regional agencies were created administratively rather than 
legislatively; as such, they require the specific delegation of authority from the MEP for 
each project they undertake (Qiu & Li, 2009). Without clear legislative authority, there is 
some doubt as to the actual authority they possess (Qiu & Li, 2009). The regional 
offices are also understaffed and underfunded (Qiu & Li, 2009), further hindering their 
ability to provide oversight. 
Integration between agencies, both within organizations tasked with ensuring 
environmental protection and within the overall governmental structure, remains a key 
problem to the success of environmental protection in mainland China. Within the 
environmental protection field, there is significant overlap between agencies and areas 
they monitor and supervise. Each creates their own standards that often do not 
coordinate well with overlapping agencies (Qiu & Li, 2009; Ma & Ortolano, 2000). Within 
the greater context of the Chinese government, there are limited effective connections 
between environmental protection organizations and other organizations that plan and 
execute development. Without these connections, environmental protection is often 
overlooked or not included in other areas of development, such as infrastructure 
development and economic development (Ma & Ortolano, 2009).  
 
4.4. Existing Ecosystem Services in China 
China has an established track record for “eco-compensation,” or environmental 
preservation through subsidies (Bennett, 2009). Recognizing that urbanization and 
deforestation were major causes of droughts in 1997 and floods in 1998 (Liu et al., 
2008), China initiated several large-scale preservation efforts including the Natural 
Forest Conservation Program (NFCP) and the Grain to Green Program (GTGP). The 
NFCP conserves forests through logging bans and incentives, and the GTGP promotes 
the conversion of cropland on rugged terrain to forests through grain and cash 
subsidies. With planned investment exceeding 700 billion yuan ($114 billion in 2013 
USD), these two programs are the largest of their kind in China and the world (Liu et al., 
2008). 
In 2009, Bennett performed extensive survey of ecosystem service markets in 
China. He highlighted several key characteristics of these emerging ecosystem service 
markets, including preferred location for these programs, their focus, and the role of the 
private sector in these markets. Bennett’s research concluded that eco-compensation 
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policies focus on water-related issues and are generally located in the more wealthy 
coastal areas, with the provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Shandong (see 
Figure 1) implementing the most advanced eco-compensation policies (Bennett, 2009). 
Thus far, market-based environmental initiatives have primarily been funded by the 
public sector; however, official policy documents emphasize that there is room for non-
governmental entities to play a larger role (Bennett, 2009). 
Chinese officials have indicated strong interest in utilizing innovative, market-
based environmental planning tools (Liu et al., 2008). In 2007, the MEP issued Guiding 
Opinions on the Development of Eco-compensation Pilot Work, which focuses on three 
key policy areas: watersheds, key ecological function areas, mineral development areas 
and natural reserves (MEP, 2007). Thus far, ecosystem service markets have primarily 
relied on government-funded compensation to prevent an undesirable action or 
encourage a desirable action, with very few readily available examples of trading credits 
on a mitigation market. 
 
Figure 1. Chinese Provinces with Strong Eco-Compensation Policies 
 
GIS Data Source: naturalearthdata.com 
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4.5. Land Usage Rights in China 
Development rights are a key element of American ecosystem services markets, 
as mitigation bankers must have ownership or property rights over the areas that they 
restore. In the United States, this can be achieved through purchasing land or its 
development rights. In contrast, all urban land in China is owned by the government;1 
however, over the past three decades China has undergone reforms that may enable 
mitigation banking.  
 Prior to the period of “reform and opening up” (“gaige kaifang”) that began in 
1978, urban land was allocated through administrative channels (Yaping & Min, 2008); it 
was publically owned and nominally worthless. Since that time, however, market 
reforms have significantly changed real estate within China. China established its Land 
Use Rights (LURs) system in 1988, which separates ownership and land usage. 
Though urban land still belongs to the state, rights to use the urban land can be 
transferred to non-governmental entities (Tian & Ma, 2008). As such, markets have 
developed around the sale of land rights. 
 Land usage rights are auctioned off by local governments. Usage rights are not 
indefinite; land usage periods range by use from 40 years (for business, tourism, and 
recreation) to 70 years (for residential uses) (Regulations on Land Use Rights, 1990). A 
range of state-owned and non-governmental organizations, including both domestic and 
foreign private companies, are able to apply for these land usage rights (Ho, 2001). 
Upon acquiring these usage rights, organizations then have the ability to begin land 
development. 
 
4.6. Mitigation Banking in China 
 The basic framework necessary for mitigation banking exists within China. This 
includes strong land usage rights, existing environmental protection agencies that can 
provide policy implementation and oversight, and an increasing focus on market-based 
environmental protection tools. This does not, however, mean that mitigation banking is 
a good fit for the Chinese context. Industry- and country-specific risk can affect the 
probability of success for both regulators and entrepreneurs within the field. 
 
5. Risk 
Outcomes for new policies are often uncertain. Risk management is a key way 
for organizations, both in the public and private sector, to weigh new opportunities 
against potential threats to their success (Haley, 2003). In terms of policy development, 
risk generally refers to variations in outcomes that policymakers do not anticipate, 
leading to suboptimal results or even outright failure (NRC, 1983). Whenever possible, 
                                               
1 Rural land is collectively owned by rural collective economic organizations and, though farmers have the 
right to use pieces of farmland (Ho, 2001), these rights cannot be transferred. This land cannot be used 
for commercial projects. However, the government can convert collectively-owned land to state-owned 
land, thus making it eligible for transfers. 
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risk should be identified, analyzed, and mitigated to increase the probability of success 
for a policy. Within the context of mitigation banking, there are two major stakeholders 
who bear the greatest amount of risk: regulators (who act as a proxy for the public) and 
entrepreneurs (mitigation bankers). Mitigating each of these actors’ risk is key to 
increasing the possibility of success of this environmental protection technique (BenDor, 
Riggsbee, & Doyle, 2011). 
 
5.1 Regulatory Risk 
Regulatory risk is the likelihood that ecosystem service regulations achieve their 
intended effect. This section divides regulatory risks into two categories: general 
regulatory risks that can occur in many different governmental contexts and China-
specific regulatory risks. 
 
5.2 General Regulatory Risk for Mitigation Banking 
Perhaps the greatest threat for mitigation banking systems is failing to conserve 
or restore wetlands. This can occur for a number of reasons. In theory, regulators 
require the replacement of damaged wetlands with newly restored wetlands. However, 
mitigation banking requires significant capital outlays and long recovery periods; to 
improve the financial viability of mitigation banking projects, many regulators will release 
mitigation credits before wetlands meet the final required ecological criteria thresholds 
for restored wetlands. In this scenario, known as advanced mitigation, regulators 
assume two types of risk: the temporary loss of wetlands and the actual loss of 
wetlands. Before the restored wetlands achieve viability, areas may experience a period 
of “temporal loss,” where areas lose ecosystem services from the destroyed wetlands 
but do not yet receive replacement services from the restored wetlands (BenDor, 2009). 
If wetlands that represent the pre-released credits do not achieve viability, regulators 
will have allowed the destruction of wetlands without replacement, resulting in a net loss 
of wetlands. 
The Clean Water Act requires that wetland losses should be avoided when 
possible, then minimized and mitigated when an impact is unavoidable. There is some 
speculation, however, that offering mitigation banking as an option offers an alternative 
to eliminating wetlands (Wilkinson et al, 2009). In the American context, however, this is 
generally considered less of a concern than other regulatory risks, as modifying site 
designs is generally cheaper than purchasing mitigation credits (Hood & Shadle, 2014).  
Inappropriately valuing ecosystem services is another major risk for regulators. 
For example, the quality of wetlands --- meaning that they offer a large number and 
variety of ecosystem services, including flood prevention, water filtering, and natural 
habitats (USEPA, 1994) --- does not necessarily relate to its societal value. As such, a 
high-quality wetland that is far from an urbanized area may be less valuable because it 
offers limited ecosystem services to people; a lower quality wetland in the center of a 
developed area may be significantly more valuable because of its location. If wetland 
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acreage is traded on a one-for-one basis, the market may skew towards replacing 
expensive urban wetlands with less expensive rural ones. As such, developing a 
dependable scale for valuing wetlands is extremely challenging, with governments 
risking undervaluing their wetlands. 
There are numerous mitigation tactics that can be used to manage the 
aforementioned risk. First, to eliminate temporal loss of wetlands, regulators can require 
that mitigation banks produce additional wetlands (BenDor, Riggsbee, & Doyle, 2011). 
Even when regulators release mitigation credits, they can add additional requirements 
to mitigation banks, including that they have already secured rights to lands; even if a 
wetland fails to achieve viability, the government will have the land where the wetlands 
once existed (Hook & Shadle, 2014). Second, the government agency that manages the 
mitigation banking program can require banks to provide funding for long-term 
maintenance of wetlands (Hook & Shadle, 2014). Third, regulators should monitor 
mitigation credit prices in relation to overall development costs; if prices become so low 
that purchasing credits becomes cheaper than avoidance, regulators should consider 
adjusting credit prices. Finally, to assist with the proper valuation of wetlands, Chinese 
regulators can utilize foreign expertise in the area.  
 
5.3 Chinese-Specific Regulatory Risk 
 Generally speaking, the aforementioned problems will be present across a wide 
variety of contexts. Market forces are playing an increasingly important role in China; as 
such, regulatory risk encountered by Western countries offer realistic examples of 
challenges that China could face. The Chinese marketplace and regulatory system, 
however, poses specific challenges towards the successful implementation of wetland 
mitigation banking. 
The literature demonstrates that the Chinese administrative structure is not 
favorable for implementing environmental policy. Even when the central and provincial 
governments are tasked with developing policy, local governments are generally in 
charge of implementation through controlling land and real estate affairs. If a policy was 
developed at a higher level of government but conflicts with local governments’ goals, 
there is significant risk that local governments will circumvent or manipulate these 
policies (Yaping & Zhao, 2008; Tian & Ma, 2009). Local administrative departments of 
environmental agencies often look to local governments rather than central authorities 
for directives, as they receive their funding from local governments (Beyer, 2006; Chow, 
2006). Therefore, though the MEP has formal authority over all lower-level 
environmental agencies, it has little leverage to ensure enforcement of its policies.  
Further complicating this problem is the close relationship between governance 
and real estate. Currently, China does not utilize a land tax, thus making local 
governments depend on revenue from land transfer fees to fund local governments 
(Tian & Ma, 2009). Therefore, cities encourage the transfer of land usage, as they 
financially benefit from these transactions. Local governments are increasingly 
10 
burdened with debt (Qing & Shao, 2013) and pressure to meet development goals; 
adding additional regulations that could devalue land could endanger the fiscal stability 
of cities. This creates a contradiction between short-term fiscal gains and long-term 
environmental problems.  
Furthermore, the Chinese political structure is not conducive to tackling of issues 
like environmental protection. Officials rise in the party through promotions from the 
central government. Whereas political loyalty used to be the greatest factor in 
promotions, lower level officials are now generally promoted to higher levels based on 
their area’s economic performance (Li & Zhou, 2005; Chen, Li, & Zhou, 2005). In fact, 
spending on environmental improvements over transportation infrastructure has been 
found to have negative effects on promotion odds (Wu et al., 2013). Though new 
President Xi Jinping has pushed policy that deemphasizes the importance of GDP 
growth in relation to other factors (“President Xi Promises...”, 2013), this practice has 
been slow to change (Wu et al., 2013).  
In China, the rate of development remains significantly faster than in other parts 
of the world. If the supply of mitigation credits was delayed or reduced, it could 
endanger this rapid development. The risk of a dearth of credits could endanger the 
system, either slowing development, significantly raising the cost of mitigation credits, 
increasing temporal loss by pre-approving restored wetland credits, or even forcing 
regulators to allow development without the purchase of credits.  
One potential mitigation possibility to address supervision problems is to create 
an independent enforcement body to ensure that local governments are held 
responsible for their mitigation obligations. China should also establish strategic 
partnerships with American agencies that have experience in the mitigation banking 
field. Though predicting demand for mitigation credits in a developing market will be 
challenging, the Ministry of Environmental Protection could publish regular reports on 
mitigation credits to increase transparency within the market. To increase the financial 
viability of the project, the government could also set minimum credit prices while the 
overall market matures. 
 
5.4 Entrepreneurial Risk 
Entrepreneurial risk is the likelihood that conservation activities will be profitable. 
Entrepreneurs must weigh the payoffs and risks associated with mitigation banking. 
This section addresses global risk, which would be present in any context, and China-
specific entrepreneurial risk. 
 
5.5 General Entrepreneurial Risk for Mitigation Banking 
Entering into the mitigation banking market requires significant capital outlay and 
long recovery periods. Capital outlay includes planning work, land acquisition, design, 
construction, and maintenance (BenDor & Doyle, 2011); given that mitigation banks 
generally rely on scale, these capital outlays are generally quite significant. In addition 
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to creating a significant barrier to entry for companies, it also adds business risk. Delays 
in receiving these credits, however, can significantly affect businesses. 
When governmental agencies develop large, broad policies, interpretation of 
these rulings is important to entrepreneurs. Less certainty around regulations, 
particularly how strictly they will be enforced, adds additional risk (Hook & Shadle, 
2014). Regulation risks include changing rules for what must be offset and applying 
regulations unevenly. However, as the ecosystem markets mature, significant rule 
changes will be less likely (Hook & Shadle, 2014).  
Estimating the price and quantity of wetlands is another key business risk. Given 
the extended time period between initial capital outlay and the actual sale of credits, 
mitigation bankers will depend on projections to estimate overall demand for credits and 
the price at which they can sell these credits. These projections, particularly in a 
nascent ecosystem services market, may be inaccurate (Hook & Shadle, 2014). If 
projections overestimate quantity required or the price that bankers call sell their credit 
for, bankers may be unable to recoup their initial capital outlay. Another risk is being 
forced to sell credits at a disadvantageous time, such as when prices do not reach initial 
projections (Hook & Shadle, 2014). 
 Hook and Shadle (2014) highlighted several industry-specific risks for mitigation, 
with the most common being ecological processes that do not perform, design or 
construction errors, and damage from natural disasters. These represent scenarios 
where restored wetlands do not perform as expected, and can result in significant 
delays for regulators releasing credits. To limit exposure to these risks, mitigation banks 
should utilize professionally qualified consultants and engineers with experience in the 
field (Hook & Shadle, 2014). 
Regardless of country, there are numerous entrepreneurial risks associated with 
mitigation banking. Recent work by Hook and Shadle (2014) has attempted to present 
potential mitigation opportunities. Perhaps the most important mitigation tactic is to 
make clear, predictable regulations related to the awarding of mitigation credits; doing 
this can significantly decrease uncertainty. To decrease the time between initial capital 
outlays and payment through selling credits, the government can also release credits to 
mitigation banks early. 
 
5.6. China-Specific Entrepreneurial Risk 
 Over the past two decades, China has been one of the most attractive locations 
for investing foreign capital. Currently, China is the second largest market in the world 
for foreign direct investment (Haley, 2003). Multinational corporations recognize that 
China’s size offers significant potential for profits. As such, a growing body of literature 
exists around identifying business risk in the Chinese market.  
Over the past decade, American mitigation banks have increasingly utilized the 
court system to ensure the implementation of consistent mitigation standards, 
particularly when related to lax implementation of policies such as in-lieu fee programs 
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that threaten their livelihood (Gardner, 2011). This would be significantly more 
challenging within the Chinese context. Though China does have a legal system, it is 
not ideally utilized to provide proper protections for companies. Environmental cases 
involve civil, criminal, and administrative litigation (Beyer, 2006). None provide 
particularly ideal scenarios, as local governments hold significant sway over local 
courts, the burden of proof in China is extremely high, and there are limited 
opportunities for punitive damages (Beyer, 2006). Financial costs also serve as a 
prohibitive barrier, with even successful plaintiffs regularly owing significant legal fees 
(Wang, 2006). 
 Inconsistent regulatory interpretation is another key risk for businesses in the 
Chinese market. Chinese environmental law is far less specific than its American 
counterparts, providing vague policy statements rather than specific goals (Wang, 2006; 
Beyer, 2006); as such, the interpretation and implementation of these policy statements 
are extremely important. Inconsistent interpretation of regulations has consistently been 
listed as one of the top concerns for American companies operating in China (AmCham, 
2013).  
Though overall economic growth has been strong over the past three decades, 
past performance does not predict future performance. An economic slowdown, 
particularly within the real estate sector, could significantly affect mitigation banking in a 
number of ways. First, a decreased demand for new buildings would decrease the 
overall demand for wetland credits, affecting both the demand for credits and their price. 
Second, given that economic growth still plays a highly influential role in determining 
cadre promotion in China (Li & Zhou, 2005; Chen, Li, & Zhou, 2005), an economic 
slowdown could decrease local governments’ willingness to implement these types of 
environmental protections. This is particularly true for local governments that are 
strapped with debt or that depend on land sale to finance development. 
 
5.7. China-Specific Entrepreneurial Risk for Multinational Companies 
There are numerous ways to enter into the Chinese market, with the most 
common being a representative office, a joint venture, or a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise (EU SME Centre, 2013; PwC, 2013). Each type of partnership presents its 
own opportunities and challenges. Representative offices are not allowed to engage in 
profit-making activities (EU SME, 2013), making it a bad choice for foreign mitigation 
banks. For joint ventures between Chinese and foreign companies, protection of 
intellectual property and lack of sole decision-making authority are major risks (PwC, 
2013). Wholly foreign-owned companies allow for strong protection of proprietary trade 
secrets and exclusive management over all decisions, but a particularly strong 
disadvantage may be a lack of relationships with local decision makers (EU SME, 
2013). This can occur for a number of reasons, including officials being affiliated with 
locally-owned businesses.  
Corruption is another major business risk for non-Chinese businesses. According 
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to a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in China (2013), corruption has 
consistently been considered one of the major business risks associated with entering 
into the Chinese market. In a recent survey, AlixPartners (2014) found that 84% of its 
respondents feel that corruption in China poses some or significant business risk. Since 
the latest leadership transition, fighting corruption has become one of the major goals of 
the new government (Oster, 2014). As part of its recent anti-corruption campaign, the 
Chinese government has been making examples of foreign companies who participate 
in these types of acts.  
Perhaps a greater risk for multinational companies, however, is running afoul of 
US and UK anti-corruption laws, which ban payment of money or anything of value to 
foreign officials to gain business advantages. Escaping liability for this type of 
corruption, however, is not easy; companies are not only liable for directly paying 
bribes, they must also know whether their money could potentially be used for bribes 
(PwC, 2013).  
The risk related to corruption and increased regulatory scrutiny should raise red 
flags for foreign companies entering into the wetland mitigation market in China. Risk 
related to corruption will be hard to avoid; however, training and education of acceptable 
practices could limit exposure to this liability (PwC, 2013). Governmental connections 
(guanxi) are exceedingly important have a significant and positive impact on a venture’s 
market performance (Luo, 1997; Lee, Pae, & Wong, 2001); as such, multinational 
companies should consider partnering with well-connected local companies. However, 
given the limited amount of judicial protection in China, extensive due diligence is key 
for multinational companies who enter into partnerships with Chinese partners (EU SME 
Centre, 2013). 
 
6. Discussion 
 From a regulatory standpoint, the necessary framework for implementing 
mitigation banking, including land use markets and a need for innovative, market-based 
environmental policy, already exists in China. However, effective mitigation banking still 
remains elusive within the United States, with many of the risks experienced in the 
United States also being applicable to China; the aforementioned China-specific 
challenges would only increase risk for regulators in China. In particular, the disconnect 
between national and local governmental organizations, the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms for vertical supervision, and the unreliability of the Chinese court system 
provide the most challenging obstacles to mitigation banking.  
That said, the risks and challenges associated with mitigation banking in China 
are not necessarily greater than with other environmental law. In fact, the specific policy 
requirements like a “no net loss” policy for wetland preservation would be a concrete 
step forward in the development of Chinese environmental law. This new policy can 
also be delegated to the regional branches of the MEP, both legitimizing them and 
clearly defining a supervisory role. 
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From an entrepreneurial standpoint, mitigation banking remains a risky 
proposition. Given the significant capital outlays required for mitigation banking, 
entrepreneurs must be able to trust that they will be able to get a return on their 
investment; unclear regulations, inconsistent implementation, and influential local 
governments that prioritize economic growth over environmental protection all endanger 
these investments. Risk is increased for foreign companies, particularly related to 
dealing with corruption.  
 To succeed, mitigation banking requires both regulators and willing 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial risk is high enough, however, that mitigation bankers 
may be unwilling to enter into the market; if there are too few mitigation bankers within 
the system to produce the required level of restored wetlands, the system could fall 
apart. As such, the Chinese government should actively work to mitigate these risks 
through establishing independent environmental regulators to administer mitigation 
banking and transparent standards for releasing mitigation credits to banks, particularly 
while the market matures and the government attempts to draw entrepreneurs into the 
system. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 Environmental protection is becoming an increasingly important element of 
sustainable development in mainland China. As China looks for market-based 
environmental protection tools, ecosystem service markets have the potential to play an 
important role in Chinese sustainable development.  
 The fundamental framework for mitigation banking exists within urban China, 
including land usage rights, flexible environmental policy, and potential judicial 
protection. That said, risk and uncertainty may significantly affect the effectiveness of 
this market-based environmental policy. From a regulatory standpoint, mitigation 
banking poses significant risks, including forced early release of credits, failing to 
achieve the desired goal of restoring wetlands, and failure to conserve a wetland over 
the long-term. Each of these risks also potentially exist within the Chinese context; 
additionally, the Chinese administrative and political structure --- with its limited 
oversight ability and emphasis on economic growth over environmental protection ---  
significantly weakens the potential for mitigation banking. Mitigation banking remains 
particularly risky for entrepreneurs, particularly in new markets where regulatory 
standards are still being developed and there is little data to predict demand and price.  
 Overall, mitigation banking provides a significant opportunity for the Chinese 
government, yet there are many obstacles in its way. Whereas regulatory risk can be 
mitigated, entrepreneurial risk is significantly higher in China than in other countries. 
Without willing private bankers, China will struggle to implement mitigation banking. 
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